Disaster Management in Pakistan

On 26th October this year, thirty six trapped Chilean mine workers were rescued by drilling a deep hole into the mine. A month later, twenty nine mine workers in Newzeland died after remaining trapped for days in a mine. Poor disaster management cost precious lives. In Pakistan, too, Disaster management is not up to the mark. Be it the devastating earthquake, the catastrophic floods, the outbreak of fires or the aftermath of bomb blasts, the management was very poor.Certain measures like National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), and Rescue 1122 were taken but none has borne fruit yet. Lack of funds, scarcity of men and machinery, lack of awareness and preparedness of general public, hard demography, negative role of media, and delocalization of disaster management centers has added to the calamity of disasters. A realistic approach, proper training to workers and public, localization of disaster management centers, public awarenes s programs and positive role of media must be ensured for the proper disaster management in Pakistan.Until now almost every disaster has hit Pakistan but the required response is given to none. The October, 2008 earthquake in Northern areas of Pakistan is a grim reminder of the scale of disaster. Almost eighty thousand people died and many towns devastated. Though, no single government with limited resources can cope with such a calamity, yet our government’s response was much late in the hard hit areas. Timely and efficient response could have saved many lives.The recent floods of July-August have also seen the demonstration of poor disaster management in our country. Though, no country is prepared for such devastating floods, our government’s response could be much better. Instead of helping the people in the affected areas, our government set all their attention in appealing for aids to other countries and arranging conferences for the donor countries. The fire mana gement is also much poor. Few months ago when fire broke out in a female hostel in Rawalpindi, the management did not have the ecessary tools to bring the situation under control. Moreover, the aftermath of bomb blasts also shows that our country is not prepared to cope with the disaster-like situation. One of the main cause of this pathetic situation of our disaster management is that the workers are not properly trained to cope with any disasters. In other countries, proper training is provided to the workers in one field to cope with that particular disaster. Unfortunately in Pakistan, the same workers are hired for every disaster to cope with.Most of our disaster management organizations are not provided with sufficient staff and machinery. The workers are much less as compared to the scale of the disaster. Also, the workers do not have all the necessary equipments to deal a disaster. Moreover, the facilities like fast transport to the disaster point are also lacking. Our uneven demography also plays a big hurdle in efficient disaster management. Sometimes, the areas hit by a disaster are out of reach, thus, badly affecting the rescue activities. Hard demography also adds to the scale of a disaster.Even a minor disaster results into a bigger loss of life and property because of the demography of our country. This was observed in the recent floods whose originating point was the northern areas and brought devastations in other parts of the country. Delocalization of disaster management units is another cause of poor disaster management in Pakistan. All the units are controlled from the federal or provincial capitals which may become a hurdle in dealing with a disaster in time. Unawareness and unpreparedness of the general public is also one of the reason for poor disaster management.Our people do not know how to deal with a disaster when they are caught with. People, sometimes, use methods which may increase the scale of a disaster instead of controlling it . Also, most of the people are unprepared to deal with a sudden disaster which results into many losses. Lack of funds with the disaster management units is also a case of poor dealing with a disaster. The disaster management organizations do not have sufficient funds to buy the machinery necessary to deal with a disaster.In order to deal effectively with any disaster in Pakistan, the government must provide proper training to workers. This is how they can deal with a disaster professionally. Moreover, the government should confer proper funds to disaster management units. All the disaster management units must be delocalized. Disaster management unit in Chitral must not be monitored from Islamabad or Peshawar. A local management body can effectively deal with a local disaster. Public training programs must be initiated so that the general public is aware how to deal with a disaster.The youths must be trained in particular areas of disasters, like fire, flood, so that that can be ca lled whenever such disaster emerges. Moreover, special television programs should be aired to aware the people how to deal with a disaster effectively. Disaster management plays a big role in a country like Pakistan where disasters are most frequent. Though, in the past much attention was not given to disaster management in the country, the government must implement the above mentioned suggestions in latter and spirit to cope well with any disaster in future.

Friedrich Von Hayek – Law, Legislation and Liberty

t of e ofj â€Å"cc L AW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY This is Hayek's major statement of political philosophy. Rejecting Marx, Freud, logical positivism and political egalitarianism, Hayek shows that the naive application of scientific methods to culture and education has been harmful and misleading, creating superstition and error rather than an age of reason and culture. Law, Legislation and Liberty combines all three volumes of Hayek's comprehensive study on the basic principles of the political order of a free society.Rules and Order deals with the basic conceptions necessary for a critical analysis of prevailing theories of justice and of conditions which a constitution securing personal liberty would have to satisfy. The Mirage of Social Justice presents a critical analysis of the theories of utilitarianism, legal positivism and ‘social justice'. The Political Order of a Free People demonstrates that the democratic ideal is in danger of miscarrying due to confusions of egali tarianism and democracy, erroneous assumptions that there can be moral standards without moral discipline, and that tradition can be ignored in proposals for restructuring society.F. A. Hayek became both a Doctor of Law and a Doctor of Political Science at the University of Vienna. He was made the first Director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research and in 1931 was appointed to a chair at the London School of Economics. In 1950 he went to the University of Chicago as Professor of Social and Moral Sciences and then became Professor of Economics at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat of Frieburg and Professor Emeritus in 1967. He was also a Fellow of the British Academy and was awarded a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1974. Hayek died in 1992. L AW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTYA new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy Volume 1 RULES AND ORDER Volume 2 THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE Volume 3 THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE F. A. Hayek Vol. 1 Rul es and Order first published 1973 Vol. 2 The Mirage of Social Justice first published 1976 Vol. 3 The Political Order of a Free People first published 1979 First published in one volume with corrections and revised preface in 1982 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Reprinted 1993, 1998 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE  © F. A. Hayek 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982 Printed and bound in Great Britain by T. l.International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0-415-09868-8 C ONTENTS Volume 1 RULES AND ORDER xv CONSOLIDATED PREFACE INTRODUCTION 8 REASON AND EV OLUTION Construction and evolutionThe tenets of Cartesian rationalism The permanent limitations of our factual knowledge Factual knowledge and science The concurrent evolution of mind and society: the role of rules The false dichotomy of ‘natural' and ‘artificial' The rise of the evolutionary approach The persistence of constructivism in current thought Our anthropomorphic language Reason and abstraction Why the extreme forms of constructivist rationalism regularly lead to a revolt against reason 2 8 9 11 15 17 20 22 24 26 29 31 COSMOS AND TAXIS 35 The concept of order The two sources of order The distinguishing properties of spontaneous orders Spontaneous orders in natureIn society, reliance on spontaneous order both extends and limits our powers of control Spontaneous orders result from their elements obeying certain rules of conduct The spontaneous order of society is made up of individuals and organizations 35 36 38 39 v 41 43 46 C ONTENTS The rules of spon taneous o rders and the rules of organization The terms ‘organism' and ‘organization' 5 55 55 67 THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF LAW 72 Law is older than legislation The lessons of ethology and cultural anthropology The process 0. [ articulation of practices Factual and normative rules Early law The classical and the medieval traditionThe distinctive attributes of law arising from custom and precedent Why grown law requires correction by legislation The origin of legislative bodies Allegiance and sovereignty 4 PRINCIPLES AND EXPEDIENCY Individual aims and collective benefits Freedom can be preserved only by following principles and is destroyed by following expediency The ‘necessities' of policy are generally the consequences of earlier measures The danger ofattaching greater importance to the predictable rather than to the merely possibleconsequences ofour actions Spurious realisln and the required courage to consider utopia The role of the lawyer in political evolutionThe modern d evelopment of law has been guided largely by false economics 3 48 52 72 74 76 78 81 82 85 88 89 91 NOMOS: THE LAW OF LIBERTY 94 The functions of the judge How the task of the judge differs fro In that of the head of an organization The aiJn of jurisdiction is the Inaintenance of an ongoing order of actions ‘Actions towards others' and the protection ofexpectations 94 vi 56 59 61 62 65 97 98 101 C ONTENTS In a dynamic order of actions only some expectations can be protected The maximal coincidence of expectations is achieved by the deli/nitation of protected domains The general problem of the effects of values on factsThe ‘purpose' of law The articulations of the law and the predictability of judicial decisions Thefunction ofthejudge is confined to a spontaneous order Conclusions 6 THESIS: THE LAW OF LEGISLATION Legislation originates from the necessity of establishing rules of organization Law and statute-the enforcement of law and the execution of commands Legislation a nd the theory of the separation of powers The governmental functions of representative asselnblies Private law and public law Constitutional law Financial legislation Administrative law and the police power The ‘In easures , of policyThe transformation of private law into public law by ‘social'legislation The Inental bias ofa legislature preoccupied with governlnent 102 106 110 112 115 118 122 124 124 126 128 129 131 134 136 137 139 141 143 145 NOTES vii C ONTENTS Volume 2 THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 7 GENERAL WELFARE AND PARTICULAR PURPOSES In a free society the general good consists principally in the facilities for the pursuit of unknown purposes The general interest and collective goods Rules and ignorance The significance of abstract rules in a world in which most of the particulars are unknown Will and opinion, ends and values, commands and rules, nd other terminological issues Abstract rules operate as ultimate values because they serve unknown particular ends Th e constructivist fallacy of utilitarianism All valid criticism or improvement of rules of conduct must proceed within a given system of rules ‘Generalization' and the test of universalizabiiity To perform their functions rules must be applied throughout the long run 8 29 THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 31 Justice is an attribute of human conduct Justice and the law Rules of just conduct are generally prohibitions of unjust conduct Not only the rules ofjust conduct, but also the test of their justice, are negativeThe significance of the negative character of the test of injustice The ideology of legal positivism The ‘pure theory of law' 31 34 viii 1 6 8 11 12 15 17 24 27 35 38 42 44 48 C ONTENTS Law and morals The ‘law of nature' Law and sovereignty 9 56 61 ‘SOCIAL' OR DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 62 59 The concept of ‘social justice' The conquest of public imagination by ‘social justice' The inapplicability of the concept ofjustice to the results of a spontaneous p rocess The rationale of the economic game in which only the conduct of the players but not the result can be just The alleged necessity of a belief in the justice of rewardsThere is no ‘value to society' The meaning of ‘social' ‘Social justice' and equality ‘Equality of opportunity' ‘Social justice' and freedom under the law The spatial range of ‘social justice' Claims for compensation for distasteful jobs The resentment of the loss of accustomed positions Conclusions APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 9 62 65 67 70 73 75 78 80 84 85 88 91 93 96 JUSTICE AND 101 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS lOT HEM ARK E TOR DE R 0 RCA TAL L A X Y The nature of the market order A free society is a pluralistic society without a common hierarchy of ends Though not asingle economy, the Great Society is still held ogether by what vulgarly are called economic relations The aim of policy in a society offree men cannot be a maximum offoreknown results but only an abstract order The game of catalla xy In judging the adaptations to changing circumstances comparisons of the new with the former position are irrelevant ix 107 107 109 112 114 115 120 C ONTENTS Rules of just conduct protect only material domains and not market values The correspondence of expectations is brought about by a disappointment of some expectations Abstract rules of conduct can determine only chances and not particular results Specific comlnands (‘interference') in a catallaxy create isorder and can never be just The aim of law should be to improve equally the chances of all The Good Society is one in which the chances of anyone selected at random are likely to be as great as possible 11 123 124 126 128 129 132 THE DISCIPLINE OF ABSTRACT RULES AND THE EMOTIONS OF THE TRIBAL SOCIETY 133 The pursuit of unattainable goals may prevent the achievement of the possible The causes of the revival of the organizational thinking of the tribe The immoral consequences of morally inspired efforts In the Great Soci ety ‘social justice' becomes a disruptive force From the care of the most unfortunate to the protection f vested interests Attempts to ‘correct' the order of the market lead to its destruction The revolt against the discipline of abstract rules The morals of the open and of the closed society The old conflict between loyalty and justice The small group in the Open Society The importance of voluntary associations 149 150 NOTES 153 x 133 134 135 137 139 142 143 144 147 C ONTENTS Volume 3 THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 12 MAJORITY OPINION AND CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY The progressive disillusionment about democracy Unlimited power the fatal effect of the prevailing form of democracy The true content of the democratic idealThe weakness of an elective assembly with unlimited 3 5 8 powe~ Coalitions of organized interests and the apparatus of para-government Agreement on general rules and on particular measures 13 13 17 THE DIVISION OF DEMOCRATIC POWERS 20 The loss of the or iginal conception of the functions of a legislature Existing representative institutions have been shaped by the needs of government, not of legislation Bodies with powers of specific direction are unsuitedfor law-making The character of existing ‘legislatures' determined by their governmental tasks Party legislation leads to the decay of democratic societyThe constructivistic superstition of sovereignty The requisite division of the powers of represen tative assemblies Democracy or demarchy? xi 20 22 25 27 31 33 35 38 C ONTENTS 14 THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR The double task of government Collective goods The delimitation of the public sector The independent sector Taxation and the size of the public sector Security Government monopoly of services Information and education Other critical issues 15 41 41 43 46 49 51 54 56 60 62 GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE MARKET 65 The advantages of competition do not depend on it being ‘perfect' Competition as a discovery proc edureIf the factual requirements of ‘perfect' competition are absent, it is not possible to makefirms act ‘as if' it existed The achievemen ts of the free market Competition and rationality Size, concentration and power The political aspects of economic power When monopoly becomes harmful The problem of anti-monopoly legislation Not individual, but group selfishness is the chief threat The consequences of a political determination of the incomes of the different groups Organizable and non-organizable interests 16 65 67 70 74 75 77 80 83 85 89 93 96 THE MISCARRIAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL: A RECAPITUALATION The miscarriage of the democratic idealA ‘bargaining' democracy The playball of group interests Laws versus directions Laws and arbitrary government Froln unequal treatment to arbitrariness Separation of powers to prevent unlimited governlnent xii 98 98 99 99 100 101 102 104 C ONTENTS 17 105 The wrong turn taken by the development ofrepresentative institutions Th e value of a model of an ideal constitution The basic principles The two representative bodies with distinctive functions Further observations on representation by age groups The governmental assembly The constitutional court The general structure of authority Emergency powers The division offinancial powers 8 A MODEL CONSTITUTION 105 107 109 111 117 119 120 122 124 126 THE CONTAINMENT OF POWER AND THE DETH RONEM ENT OF POL ITICS 128 Lilnited and unlimited power Peace, freedom and justice: the three great negatives Centralization and decentralization The rule of the Inajority versus the rule of laws approved by the majority Moral confusion and the decay of language Democratic procedure and egalitarian objectives ‘State' and ‘society' A game according to rules can never know justice of treatment The para-government of organized interests and the hypertrophy of go vern men t Unlimited democracy and centralizationThe devolution of internal policy to local government The abo lition of the government monopoly of services The dethronement ofpolitics 128 130 132 133 135 137 139 141 143 145 146 147 149 EPILOGUE: THE THREE SOURCES OF HUMAN VALUES 153 The errors of sociobiology The process of cultural evolution The evolution of self-maintaining complex systems The stratification of rules of conduct 153 155 158 159 xiii C ONTENTS Customary rules and economic order The discipline offreedom The re-emergence of suppressed primordial instincts Evolution, tradition and progress The construction of new morals to serve old instincts: A1arxThe destruction ofindispensable values by scientific error: Freud The tables turned 161 163 165 168 169 173 175 177 NOTES I N DE X 0 F AUT H 0 R SCI TED I N VOL U M E S SUBJECT INDEX TO VOLUMES xiv 1-3 1- 3 209 217 C ONSOLIDATED PREFACE TO ONE-VOLUME EDITION At last this work can appear in the form it was intended to take when I started on it nearly twenty years ago. Half way through this period, when a first draft was nearly comple ted, a weakening of my powers, which fortunately proved to be temporary, made me doubt whether I should ever be able to complete it and led me to publish in 1973 a fully completed part of what were to become three eparate volumes. When a year later I found my powers returning I discovered that various circumstances made substantial revisions necessary of even those further parts of the draft which I had thought to be in fairly finished state. As I explained in the preface to the second volume, which appeared in 1976, the chief reason was my dissatisfaction with that central chapter which gave that volume its sub-title The Mirage of Social Justice. This account] had better repeat here: I had devoted to this subject an enormous chapter in which I had tried to show for a large number of instances that what as claimed as demanded by ‘social justice' could not be justice because the underlying consideration (one could hardly call it a principle) was not capable of general applicati on. The point I was then mainly anxious to demonstrate was that people would never be able to agree on what ‘social justice' required, and that any attempt to determine remunerations according to what it was thought was demanded by justice would make the market unworkable. I have now become convinced, however, that the people who habitually employ the phrase simply do not know themselves what they mean by t and just use it as an assertion that a claim is justified ‘without giving a reason for it. In my earlier efforts to criticize the concept I had all the time the feeling that I was hitting into a void and I finally attempted, what in such cases one ought to do in the first xv P REFACE instance, to construct as good a case in support of the ideal of ‘social justice' as was in my power. It was only then that I perceived that the Emperor had no clothes on, that is, that the term ‘social justice' was entirely empty and meaningless. As the boy in Hans Christian Andersen's story, I ‘could not see anything, because there was nothing to be seen. The more I tried to give it a definite meaning the more it fell apart-the intuitive feeling of indignation which we undeniably often experience in particular instances proved incapable of being justified by a general rule such as the conception of justice demands. But to demonstrate that a universally used expression which to many people embodies a quasi-religious belief has no content whatever and serves merely to insinuate that we ought to consent to a demand of some particular group is much more difficult than to show that a conception is wrong.In these circumstances I could not content myself to show that particular attempts to achieve ‘social justice' would not work, but had to explain that the phrase meant nothing at all, and that to employ it was either thoughtless or fraudulent. It is not pleasant to have to argue against a superstition which is held most strongly by men and women who are often regarded as the best in our society, and against a belief that has become almost the new religion of our time (and in which many of the ministers of old religion have found their refuge), and which has become the recognized mark of the good man.But the present universality of that belief proves no more the reality of its object than did the universal belief in witches or the philosopher's stone. Nor does the long history of the conception of distributive justice understood as an attribute of individual conduct (and now often treated as synonymous with ‘social justice') prove that it has any relevance to the positions arising from the market process. I believe indeed that the greatest service I can still render to my fellow men would be if it were in my power to make them ashamed of ever again using that hollow incantation.I felt it my duty at least to try and free them of that incubus which today makes fine sentiments the instruments for the destruction of all va lues of a free civilization-and to try this at the risk of gravely offending many the strength of whose moral feelings I respect. xvi P REFACE The present version of the central chapter of this volume has in consequence of this history in some respects a slightly different character from the rest of the volume which in all essentials was completed six or seven years earlier. There was, on the one hand, nothing I could positively demonstrate but y task was to put the burden of proof squarely on those who employ the term. On the other hand, in re-writing that chapter I no longer had that easy access to adequate library facilities which I had when I prepared the first draft of this volume. I have in consequence not been able in that chapter systematically to take account of the more recent literature on the topics I discussed as I had endeavoured to do in the rest of this volume. In one instance the feeling that I ought to justify my position vis-a-vis a major recent work has also cont ributed to delay the completion of this volume.But after careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that what I might have to say about John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1972) would not assist in the pursuit of my immediate object because the differences between us seemed more verbal than substantial. Though the first impression of readers may be different, Rawls' statement which I quote later in this volume (p. 100) seems to me to show that we agree on what is to me the essential point. Indeed, as I indicate in a note to that passage, it appears to me that Rawls has been widely misunderstood on this central issue.The preface to the third volume, which ultimately appeared in 1979, gives a similar account of the further development that also had better be repeated here: Except for what are now the last two chapters, most of it was in fairly finished form as long ago as the end of 1969 when indifferent health forced me to suspend the efforts to complete it. It was then, indeed , doubt whether I would ever succeed in doing so which made me decide to publish separately as volume 1 the first third of what had been intended to form a single volume, because it was in completely finished form. When I was able to return to ystematic work I discovered, as I have explained in the preface to volume 2, that at least one chapter of the original draft of that part required complete re-writing. Of the last third of the original draft only what was xvii P REFACE intended to be the last chapter (chapter 18) had not been completed at the time when I had discontinued work. But while I believe I have now more or less carried out the original intention, over the long period which has elapsed my ideas have developed further and I was reluctant to send out what inevitably must be my last systematic work without at east indicating in what direction my ideas have been moving. This has had the effect that not only what was meant to be the concluding chapter contains a good deal o f, I hope, improved re-statements of arguments I have developed earlier, but that I found it necessary to add an Epilogue which expresses more directly the general view of moral and political evolution which has guided me in the whole enterprise. I have also inserted as chapter 16 a brief recapitulation of the earlier argument. There were also other causes which have contributed to delay completion. As I had hesitated whether I ought to ublish volume 2 without taking full account of the important work of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972), two new important books in the field have since appeared which, if I were younger, I should feel I must fully digest before completing my own survey of the same kind of problems: Robert Nozik, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, 1974) and Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford, 1975). Rightly or wrongly I finally decided that if I made an effort fully to absorb their argument before concluding my own exposition, I would probably never do this. But I regard it as my duty to tell the younger readers that they cannot fully omprehend the present state of thought on these issues unless they make that effort which I must postpone until I have completed the statement of the conclusions at which I had arrived before I became acquainted with these works. The long period over which the present work has been growing also had the effect that I came to regard it as expedient to change my terminology on some points on which I should warn the reader. It was largely the growth of cybernetics and the related subjects of information and system theory which persuaded me that expression other than those which I habitually used may be more readily comprehensible o the contemporary reader. Though I still like and occasionally use the term ‘spontaneous order', I agree that xviii P REFACE ‘self-generating order' or ‘self-organizing structures' are sometimes more precise and unambiguous and therefore frequently us e them instead of the former term. Similarly, instead of ‘order', in conformity with today's predominant usage, I occasionally now use ‘system'. Also ‘information' is clearly often preferable to where I usually spoke of ‘knowledge', since the former clearly refers to the knowledge of particular facts rather than theoretical knowledge to which plain ‘knowledge' might be thought to refer.Finally, since ‘constructivist' appears to some people still to carry the commendatory connotation derived from the adjective ‘constructive', I felt it advisable, in order clearly to bring out the deprecatory sense in which I use that term (significantly of Russian origin) to employ instead the, I am afraid, still more ugly term ‘constructivistic'. I should perhaps add that I feel some regret that I have not had the courage consistently to employ certain other neologisms I had suggested, such as ‘cosmos', ‘taxis', ‘nomos', ‘thesis ', ‘catallaxy' and ‘demarchy'.But what the exposition has thereby lost in precision it will probably have gained in ready intelligibility. Perhaps I should also again remind the reader that the present work was never intended to give an exhaustive or comprehensive exposition of the basic principles on which a society of free man could be maintained, but was rather meant to fill the gaps which I discovered after I had made an attempt to restate, in The Constitution of Liberty, for the contemporary reader the traditional doctrines of classical liberalism in a form suited to contemporary problems and thinking.It is for this reason a much less complete, much more difficult and personal but, I hope, also more original work than the former. But it is definitely supplementary to and not a substitute for it. To the non-specialist reader I would therefore recommend reading The Constitution of Liberty before he proceeds to the more detailed discussion or particular examination of problems to which I have attempted solutions in these volumes. But they are intended to explain why I still regard what have now long been treated as antiquated beliefs as greatly superior to any alternative octrines which have recently found more favour with the public. The reader will probably gather that the whole work has xix P REFACE been inspired by a growing apprehension about the direction in which the political order of what used to be regarded as the most advanced countries is teuding. The growing conviction, for which the book gives the reasons, that this threatening development towards a totalitarian state is made inevitable by certain deeply entrenched defects of construction of the generally accepted type of ‘democratic' government has forced me to think through alternative arrangements.I would like to repeat here that, though I profoundly believe in the basic principles of democracy as the only effective method which we have yet discovered of making peaceful cha nge possible, and am therefore much alarmed by the evident growing disillusionment about it as a desirable Inelhod of government-much assisted by the increasing abuse of the word to indicate supposed ailns of governmentI am becoming more and more convinced that we are moving towards an impasse from which political leaders will offer to extricate us by desperate means. When the present volume leads up to a proposal of basic lteration of the structure of democratic government, which at this time most people will regard as wholly impractical, this is meant to provide a sort of intellectual stand-by equipment for the time, which may not be far away, when the breakdown of the existing institutions becomes unmistakable and when I hope it may show a way out. It should enable us to preserve what is truly valuable in democracy and at the same time free us of its objectionable features which most people still accept only because they regard them as inevitable. Together with the similar stand- by scheme I have proposed for depriving overnment of the monopolistic powers of control of the supply of money, equally necessary if we are to escape the nightmare of increasingly totalitarian powers, which I have recently outlined in another publication (Denationalisation of Money, 2nd edn, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1978), it proposes what is a possible escape from the fate which threatens us. I shall be content if I have persuaded some people that if the first experiment of freedom we have tried in modern times should prove a failure, it is not because freedom is an impracticable ideal, but because we have tried it the wrong way. xx P REFACEI trust the reader will forgive a certain lack of system and some unnecessary repetitions in an exposition which has been written and re-written over a period of fifteen years, broken by a long period of indifferent health. I am very much aware of this, but if I tried in my eightieth year to recast it all, I shall probably never co mplete the task. The Epilogue I added to that volume before publication indicates that even during the period of restricted activity my ideas have continued to develop imperceptibly more than I was aware before I attempted to sketch my present general view of the whole position in a public lecture.As I said in the concluding words of the present text, it became clear to me that what I said in that Epilogue should not be an Epilogue but a new beginning. I am glad to be able to say now that it has turned out to be such and that that Epilogue has become the outline of a new book of which I have now completed a first draft. There are a few acknowledgments that I ought to repeat here. Some ten years ago Professor Edwin McClellan of the University of Chicago had again, as on earlier occasions, taken great trouble to make my exposition more readable than I myself could have done.I am deeply grateful for his sympathetic efforts but should add, that since even in the early parts the draft on which he has worked has since undergone further change, he must not be held responsible for whatever defects the present version still has. I have however incurred further obligations to Professor Arthur Shenfield of London who has gone through the final text of the third volume and corrected there a variety of substantial as well as stylistic points, and to Mrs Charlotte Cubitt who, in preparing the final copy of that volume, has further polished the text.I am also much indebted to Mrs Cornelia Crawford of Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, who has again applied her proven skill and understanding in preparing the subject index giving references to all three still separately paginated volumes. xxi L AW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY Volume 1 RULES AND ORDER Intelligent beings may have laws of their own making; but they also have some which they never made. (Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des lois, I, p. i) I NTRODUCTIONThere seems to be only one solution to the problem: that the elite of mankind a cquire a consciousness of the limitation of the human mind, at once simple and profound enough, humble and sublime enough, so that Western civilisation will resign itself to its inevitable disadvantages. G. Ferrero* When Montesquieu and the framers of the American Constitution articulated the conception of a limiting constitution 1 that had grown up in England, they set a pattern which liberal constitutionalism has followed ever since.Their chief aim was to provide institutional safeguards of individual freedom; and the device in which they placed their faith was the separation of powers. In the form in which we know this division of power between the legislature, the judiciary, and the administration, it has not achieved what it was meant to achieve. Governments everywhere have obtained by constitutional means powers which those men had meant to deny them. The first attempt to secure individual liberty by constitutions has evidently failed. Constitutionalism means limited governmen t. But the interpretation given to the traditional formulae of constitutionalism has made it possible to reconcile these with a conception of democracy according to which this is a form of government where the will of the majority on any particular matter is unlimited. 3 As a result it has already been seriously suggested that constitutions are an antiquated survival which have no place in the modern conception of government. 4 And, indeed, what function is served by a constitution which makes omnipotent government possible?Is its function to be merely that governments work smoothly and efficiently, whatever their aims? In these circumstances it seems important to ask what those founders of liberal constitutionalism would do today if, pursuing I NTRODUCTION the aims they did, they could command all the experience we have gained in the meantime. There is much we ought to have learned from the history of the last two hundred years that those men with all their wisdom could not have kn own. To me their aims seem to be as valid as ever.But as their means have proved inadequate, new institutional invention is needed. In another book I have attempted to restate, and hope to have in some measure succeeded in clarifying, the traditional doctrine of liberal constitutionalism. 5 But it was only after I had completed that work that I came to see clearly why those ideals had failed to retain the support of the idealists to whom all the great political movements are due, and to understand what are the governing beliefs of our time which have proved irreconcilable with them.It seems to me now that the reasons for this development were chiefly: the loss of the belief in a justice independent of personal interest; a consequent use of legislation to authorize coercion, not merely to prevent unjust action but to achieve particular results for specific persons or groups; and the fusion in the same representative assemblies of the task of articulating the rules of just conduct wit h that of directing government.What led me to write another book on the same general theme as the earlier one was the recognition that the preservation of a society of free men depends on three fundamental insights which have never been adequately expounded and to which the three main parts of this book are devoted. The first of these is that a selfgenerating or spontaneous order and an organization are distinct, and that their distinctiveness is related to the two different kinds of rules or laws which prevail in them.The second is that what today is generally regarded as ‘social' or distributive justice has meaning only within the second of these kinds of order, the organization; but that it is meaningless in, and wholly incompatible with, that spontaneous order which Adam Smith called ‘the Great Society', and Sir Karl Popper called ‘the Open Society'.The third is that the predominant model of liberal democratic institutions, in which the san1e representative bod y lays down the rules of just conduct and directs government, necessarily leads to a gradual transformation of the spontaneous order of a free society into a totalitarian system conducted in the service of some coalition of organized interests. This development, as I hope to show, is not a necessary consequence of democracy, but an effect only of that particular form of unlimited government vvith which delllocracy has come to be identi2 I NTRODUCTION fied.If I aln right, it would indeed seem that the particular form of representative government which now prevails in the Western world, and vhich many feel they must defend because they nlistakenly regard it as the only possible form of democracy, has an inherent tendency to lead away from the ideals it was intended to serve. It can hardly be denied that, since this type of democracy has come to be accepted, we have been moving away from that ideal of individual liberty of which it had been regarded as the surest safeguard, and are now drifting towards a system â€Å",~hich nobody wanted.Signs are not wanting, however, that unlimited democracy is riding for a fall and that it will go down, not with a bang, but with a whimper. It is already becoming clear that many of the expectations that have been raised can be met only by taking the powers of decision out of the hands of democratic assemblies and entrusting them to the established coalitions of organized interests and their hired experts. Indeed, we are already told that the function of representative bodies has become to ‘mobilize consent', 6 that is, not to express but to manipulate the opinion of those whom they represent.Sooner or later the people will discover that not only are they at the mercy of new vested interests, but that the political machinery of para-government, which has grown up as a necessary consequence of the provision-state, is producing an impasse by preventing society from making those adaptations which in a changing world are requ ired to maintain an existing standard of living, let alone to achieve a rising one. It will probably be some time before people will admit that the institutions they have created have led them into such an impasse. But it is probably not too early to begin thinking about a way out.And the conviction that this will demand some drastic revision of beliefs now generally accepted is what makes me venture here on some institutional invention. If I had known when I published The Constitution of Liberty that I should proceed to the task attempted in the present work, I should have reserved that title for it. I then used the term ‘constitution' in the wide sense in which we use it also to describe the state of fitness of a person. It is only in the present book that I address myself to the question of what constitutional arrangements, in the legal sense, might be most conducive to the preservation of individual freedom.Except for a bare hint which fev readers will have noticed,7 I con fined myself in the earlier book to stating the principles which the existing types of government would have 3 I NTRODUCTION to follow if they wished to preserve freedom. Increasing awareness that the prevailing institutions make this impossible has led me to concentrate more and more on what at first seemed merely an attractive but impracticable idea, until the utopia lost its strangeness and came to appear to me as the only solution of the problem in which the founders of liberal constitutionalism failed.Yet to this problem of constitutional design I turn only in volume 3 of this work. To make a suggestion for a radical departure from established tradition at all plausible required a critical re-examination not only of current beliefs but of the real meaning of some fundamental conceptions to which we still pay lip-service. In fact, I soon discovered that to carry out what I had undertaken would require little less than doing for the twentieth century what Montesquieu had done for the eighteenth.The reader will believe me when I say that in the course of the work I more than once despaired of my ability to come even near the aim I had set myself. I am not speaking here of the fact that Montesquieu was also a great literary genius whom no mere scholar can hope to emulate. I refer rather to the purely intellectual difficulty which is a result of the circumstance that, while for Montesquieu the field which such an undertaking must cover had not yet split into numerous specialisms, it has since become impossible for any man to master even the most important relevant works.Yet, although the problem of an appropriate social order is today studied from the different angles of economics, jurisprudence, political science, sociology, and ethics, the problem is one which can be approached successfully only as a whole. This means that whoever undertakes such a task today cannot claim professional competence in all the fields with which he has to deal, or be acquainted w ith the specialized literature available on all the questions that arise.Nowhere is the baneful effect of the division into specialisms more evident than in the two oldest of these disciplines, economics and law. Those eighteenth-century thinkers to whom we owe the basic conceptions of liberal constitutionalism, David Hume and Adam Smith, no less than Montesquieu, were still concerned with what some of them called the ‘science of legislation', or with principles of policy in the widest sense of this term.One of the main themes of this book will be that the rules of just conduct which the lawyer studies serve a kind of order of the character of which the lawyer is largely ignorant; and that this order is studied chiefly by the economist who in turn is similarly ignorant of the character of 4 I NTRODUCTION the rules of conduct on which the order that he studies rests. The most serious effect of the splitting up among several specialisms of what was once a common field of inquiry , however, is that it has left a no-man's-land, a vague subject sometimes called ‘social philosophy'.Some of the chief disputes within those special disciplines turn, in fact, on differences about questions which are not peculiar to, and are therefore also not systematically examined by, anyone of them, and which are for this reason regarded as ‘philosophical'. This serves often as an excuse for taking tacitly a position which is supposed either not to require or not to be capable of rational justification. Yet these crucial issues on which not only factual interpretations but also political positions wholly depend, are questions which can and must be answered on the basis of fact and logic.They are ‘philosophical' only in the sense that certain widely but erroneously held beliefs are due to the influence of a philosophical tradition which postulates a false answer to questions capable of a definite scientific treatment. In the first chapter of this book I attempt to show that certain widely held scientific as well as political views are dependent on a particular conception of the formation of social institutions, which I shall call ‘constructivist rationalism' -a conception which assumes that all social institutions are, and ought to be, the product of deliberate design.This intellectual tradition can be shown to be false both in its factual and in its normative conclusions, because the existing institutions are not all the product of design, neither would it be possible to make the social order vvholly dependent on design without at the same time greatly restricting the utilization of available knowledge. That erroneous view is closely connected with the equally false conception of the human mind as an entity standing outside the cosmos of nature and society, rather than being itself the product of the same process of evolution to which the institutions of society are due.I have indeed been led to the conviction that not only some of the scientific but also the most important political (or ‘ideological') differences of our time rest ultimately on certain basic philosophical differences between two schools of thought, of which one can be shown to be mistaken. They are both commonly referred to as rationalism, but I shall have to distinguish between them as the evolutionary (or, as Sir Karl Popper calls it, ‘critical') rationalism on the one hand, and the erroneous constructivist (Popper's naIve') rationalism on the other. If the constructivist rationalism 5 I NTRODUCTION can be shovn to be based on factually false assumptions, a whole family of schools of scientific as well as political thought will also be proved erroneous. In the theoretical fields it is particularly legal positivisn1 and the connected belief in the necessity of an unlimited ‘sovereign' pover which stand or fall vith this error.The same is true of utilitarianism, at least in its particularistic or ‘act' variety; also, I am afraid that a not inconsiderable part of what is called ‘sociology' is a direct child of constructivisn1 when it presents its aims as ‘to create the future of mankind' 8 or, as one writer put it, claims ‘that socialism is the logical and inevitable outcome of sociology'. 9 All the totalitarian doctrines, of vhich socialism is merely the noblest and most influential, indeed belong here.They are false, not because of the values on vhich they are based, but because of a misconception of the forces vhich have Inade the Great Society and civilization possible. r-rhe demonstration that the differences between socialists and non-socialists ultimately rest on purely intellectual issues capable of a scientific resolution and not on different judgments of value appears to me one of the most important outcomes of the train of thought pursued in this book.It appears to me also that the same factual error has long appeared to make insoluble the most crucial problem of politi cal organization, namely ho† to limit the ‘popular will' vithout placing another ‘†rill' above it. As soon as ve recognize that the basic order of the Great Society cannot rest entirely on design, and can therefore also not aim at particular foreseeable results, we see that the requirement, as legitilnation of all authority, of a commitment to general principles approved by general opinion, Inay well place effective restrictions on the particular yill of all authority, including that of the Inajority of the rnoment.On these issues vhich vill be my main concern, thought seems to have made little advance since David Hume and Imlnanuel Kant, and in several respects it vill be at the point at which they left off that our analysis will have to resume. It was they who came nearer than anybody has done since to a clear recognition of the status of values as independent and guiding conditions of all rational construction.What I am ultimately concerned with here, alth ough I can deal only vith a small aspect of it, is that destruction of values by scientific error which has increasingly come to seem to me the great tragedy of our time-a tragedy, because the values which scientific error tends to dethrone are the indispensable foundation of all our 6 I NTRODUCTION civilization, including the very scientific efforts which have turned against them.The tendency of constructivism to represent those values which it cannot explain as determined by arbitrary human – decisions, or acts of will, or mere emotions, rather than as the necessary conditions of facts which are taken for granted by its expounders, has done much to shake the foundations of civilization, and of science itself, which also rests on a system of values which cannot be scientifically proved. 7 ONE REASON AND EVOLUTION To relate by whom, and in what connection, the true law of the formation of free states was recognized, and how this iscovery, closely akin to those which, under th e names of development, evolution, and continuity, have given a new and deeper method to other sciences, solved the ancient problem betveen stability and change, and determined the authority of tradition on the progress of thought. Lord Acton* Construction and evolution There are two ways of looking at the pattern of human activities which lead to very different conclusions concerning both its explanation and the possibilities of deliberately altering it. Of these, one is based on conceptions which are demonstrably false, yet are so pleasing to human anity that they have gained great influence and are constantly employed even by people who know that they rest on a fiction, but believe that fiction to be innocuous. The other, although few people will question its basic contentions if they are stated abstractly, leads in some respects to conclusions so unwelcome that few are willing to follow it through to the end. The first gives us a sense of unlimited power to realize our wishes, w hile the second leads to the insight that there are limitations to what we can deliberately bring about, and to the recognition that some of our present hopes are delusions.Yet the effect of allowing ourselves to be deluded by the first view has always been that n1an has actually limited the scope of what he can achieve. For it has always been the recognition of the limits of the possible which has enabled man to make full use of his powers. 1 The first view holds that human institutions will serve human purposes only if they have been deliberately designed for these purposes, often also that the fact that an institution exists is evidence of its having been created for a purpose, and always that we R EASON AND EVOLUTION should so re-design society and its institutions that all our actions will be wholly guided by known purposes. To most people these propositions seem almost self-evident and to constitute an attitude alone worthy of a thinking being. Yet the belief underlying them, that we owe all beneficial institutions to design, and that only such design has made or can make them useful for our purposes, is largely false.This view is rooted originally in a deeply ingrained propensity of primitive thought to interpret all regularity to be found in phenomena anthropomorphically, as the result of the design of a thinking mind. But just when man was well on the â€Å"vay to emancipating himself from this naive conception, it was revived by the support of a powerful philosophy with which the aim of freeing the human mind from false prejudices has become closely associated, and which became the dominant conception of the Age of Reason.The other view, which has slowly and gradually advanced since antiquity but for a time was almost entirely overwhelmed by the more glamorous constructivist view, was that that orderliness of society which greatly increased the effectiveness of individual action was not due solely to institutions and practices which had been invente d or designed for that purpose, but was largely due to a process described at first as ‘growth' and later as ‘evolution', a process in which practices which had first been adopted for other reasons, or even purely accidentally, were preserved because they enabled the group in which they had arisen to prevail over others. Since its first systematic development in the eighteenth century this view had to struggle not only against the anthropomorphism of primitive thinking but even more against the reinforcement these naive views had received from the new rationalist philosophy. It was indeed the challenge which this philosophy provided that led to the explicit formulation of the evolutionary view. 2 The tenets of Cartesian rationalism The great thinker from whom the basic ideas of what we shall call constructivist rationalism received their most complete expression was Rene Descartes.But while he refrained from drawing the conclusions from them for social and moral argument s, 3 these were mainly elaborated by his slightly older (but much more long-lived) contemporary, Thomas Hobbes. Although Descartes' immediate concern was to establish criteria for the truth of propositions, these 9 R EASON AND EVOLUTION were inevitably also applied by his follovers to judge the appropriateness and justification of actions. The ‘radical doubt' which made him refuse to accept anything as true which could not be logically derived from explicit premises that were ‘clear and distinct', and therefore beyond possible doubt, deprived of validity all those rules of conduct which could not be justified in this manner. Although Descartes himself could escape the consequences by scribing such rules of conduct to the design of an omniscient deity, for those among his followers to whom this no longer seemed an adequate explanation the acceptance of anything which was based merely on tradition and could not be fully justified on rational grounds appeared as an irration al superstition. The rejection as ‘mere opinion' of all that could not be demonstrated to be true by his criteria became the dominant characteristic of the movement which he started. Since for Descartes reason was defined as logical deduction from explicit premises, rational action also came to mean only such action as was determined entirely by known and demonstrable truth. It is almost an inevitable step from this to the conclusion that only what is true in this sense can lead to successful action, and that therefore everything to which man owes his achievements is a product of his reasoning thus conceived.Institutions and practices which have not been designed in this n1anner can be beneficial only by accident. Such became the characteristic attitude of Cartesian constructivism with its contempt for tradition, custom, and history in general. Man's reason alone should enable him to construct society anew. 4 This ‘rationalist' approach, however, meant in effect a relaps e into earlier, anthropomorphic modes of thinking. It produced a reneved propensity to ascribe the origin of all institutions of culture to invention or design. Morals, religion and law, language and writing, money and the market, were thought of as having been deliberately constructed by somebody, or at least as owing whatever perfection they possessed to such design.This intentionalist or pragmatic 5 account of history found its fullest expression in the conception of the formation of society by a social contract, first in Hobbes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a direct follover of Descartes. 6 Even though their theory was not alvvays meant as a historical account of what actually happened, it was always meant to provide a guideline for deciding whether or not existing institutions were to be approved as rational. 10 R EASON AND EVOLUTION I t is to this philosophical conception that we owe the preference which prevails to the present day for everything that is done ‘consciously' or ‘deliberately', and from it the terms ‘irrational' or ‘non-rational' derive the derogatory meaning they now have.Because of this the earlier presumption in favour of traditional or established institutions and usages became a presumption against them, and ‘opinion' came to be thought of as ‘mere' opinionsomething not demonstrable or decidable by reason and therefore not to be accepted as a valid ground for decision. Yet the basic assumption underlying the belief that man has achieved n1astery of his surroundings mainly through his capacity for logical deduction from explicit premises is factually false, and any attempt to confine his actions to what could thus be justified would deprive him of many of the most effective means to success that have been available to him. It is simply not true that our actions owe their effectiveness solely or chiefly to knowledge which we can state in vords and vhich can therefore constitute the exp licit premises of a syllogism.Many of the institutions of society which are indispensable conditions for the successful pursuit of our conscious aims are in fact the result of customs, habits or practices which have been neither invented nor are observed with any such purpose in view. We live in a society in which we can successfully orientate ourselves, and in which our actions have a good chance of achieving their aims, not only because our fellows are governed by known aims or known connections between means and ends, but because they are also confined by rules whose purpose or origin we often do not know and of whose very existence we are often not aware. Man is as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one. And he is successful not because he knows why he ought to observe the rules vhich he does observe, or is even capable of stating all these rules in vords, but because his thinking and acting are governed by rules which have by a process of selection been evolved i n the society in which he lives, and vhich are thus the product of the experience of generations. The permanent limitations of our factual knowledge The constructivist approach leads to false conclusions because man's actions are largely successful, not merely in the primitive stage but perhaps even more so in civilization, because they are adapted both II R EASON AND EVOLUTION to the particular facts which he knows and to a great many other facts he does not and cannot know. And this adaptation to the general circumstances that surround him is brought about by his observance of rules which he has not designed and often does not even knovv explicitly, although he is able to honour them in action.Or, to put this differently, our adaptation to our environment does not consist only, and perhaps not even chiefly, in an insight into the relations between cause and effect, but also in our actions being governed by rules adapted to the kind of world in which we live, that is, to circumstan ces which we are not aware of and which yet determine the pattern of our successful actions. Complete rationality of action in the Cartesian sense demands complete knowledge of all the relevant facts. A designer or engineer needs all the data and full power to control or manipulate them if he is to organize the material objects to produce the intended result. But the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can possibly know. And our whole civilization in consequence rests, and must rest, on our believing rnuch that we cannot know to be true in the Cartesian sense. What we must ask the reader to keep constantly in mind throughout this book, hen, is the fact of the necessary and irremediable ignorance on everyone's part of most of the particular facts which determine the actions of all the several members of human society. This may at first seem to be a fact so obvious and incontestable as hardly to deserve mention, and still less to require proof. Ye t the result of not constantly stressing it is that it is only too readily forgotten. This is so mainly because it is a very inconvenient fact which makes both our attempts to explain and our attempts to influence intelligently the processes of society very much more difficult, and which places severe limits on what we can say or do about them. There exists therefore a great temptation, as a first approximation, to begin with the assumption that we know everything needed for full explanation or control.This provisional assumption is often treated as something of little consequence which can later be dropped without much effect on the conclusions. Yet this necessary ignorance of most of the particulars which enter the order of a Great Society is the source of the central problem of all social order and the false assumption by which it is provisionally put aside is mostly never explicitly abandoned but merely conveniently forgotten. The argument then proceeds as if that ignorance did not matter. 12 R EASON AND EVOLUTION The fact of our irrcrnediable ignorance of most of the particular facts which determine the processes of society is, however, the reason why most social institutions have taken the form they actually have.To talk about a society about vvhich either the observer or any of its members knows all the particular facts is to talk about something wholly different from anything vhich has ever existcda society in which lnost of vhat ve find in our society vould not and could not exist and vhich, if it ever occurred, vould possess properties ve cannot even imagine. I have discussed the importance of our necessary ignorance of the concrete facts at some length in an earlier book 8 and will emphasize its central importance here mainly by stating it at the head of the vhole exposition. But there are several points vhich require re-statement or elaboration. In he first instance, the incurable ignorance of everyone which I am speaking is the ignorance of partic ular facts which are or will become knovn to somebody and thereby affect the vhole structure of society. rrhis structure of human activities constantly adapts itself, and functions through adapting itself, to millions of facts which in their entirety are not known to anybody. The significance of this process is most obvious and Tas at first stressed in the economic field. As it has been said, ‘the economic life of a non -socialist society consists of millions of relations or flows between individual firms and households. Ve can establish certain theorems about them, but vve can never observe all. 9 The insight into the significance of our institutional ignorance in the economic sphere, and into the methods by vhich ve have learnt to overcome this obstacle, vas in fact the starting point 10 for those ideas which in the present book arc systelnatically applied to a much wider field. It will be one of our chief contentions that most of the rules of conduct vhich govern our action s, and lnost of the institutions which arise out of this regularity, are adaptations to the impossibility of anyone taking conscious account of all the particular facts which enter into the order of society. vVe shall see, in particular, that the possibility of justice rests on this necessary limitation of our factual knowledge, and that insight into the nature of justice is therefore denied to all those constructivists  ·ho habitually argue on the assulnption of omniscience.Another consequence of this basic fact vhich must be stressed here is that only in the small groups of primitive society can collaboration betveen the members rest largely on the circumstance that at anyone moment they will know more or less the same particular 13 R EASON AND EVOLUTION circulnstances. SOl1le wise men 111ay be better at interpreting the immediately perceived circumstances or at remembering things in rClnote places unkndvvn to the others. But the concrete events vhich the individuals encounter i n their daily pursuits will be very much the same for all, and they will act together because the events they know and the objectives at which they aim are more or less the same.The situation is wholly different in the Great 11 or Open Society where millions of men interact and where civilization as we know it has developed. Econon1ics has long stressed the ‘division of labour' which such a situation involves. But it has laid much less stress on the fragmentation of knowledge, on the fact that each Inember of society can have only a small fraction of the knowledge possessed by all, and that each is therefore ignorant of most of the facts on which the working of society rests. Yet it is the utilization of much more knowledge than anyone can possess, and therefore the fact that each moves within a coherent structure most of whose deterlninants are unknown to him, that constitutes the distinctive feature of all advanced civilizations.In civilized society it is indeed not so much the greater knowledge that the individual can acquire, as the greater benefit he receives from the knovledge possessed by others, which is the cause of his ability to pursue an infinitely wider range of ends than merely the satisfaction of his most pressing physical needs. Indeed, a ‘civilized' individual may be very ignorant, more ignorant than many a savage, and yet greatly benefit from the civilization

Corporate finance Essay

There are three main reasons companies purchase investments in debt or stock securities. The first reason is if corporations have extra cash that they don’t need for immediate purchase of operating assets. The second reason is; Companies purchase investments to generate earnings from investment income. The third reason companies purchase investments is for strategic reasons. A company can exercise some influence over a customer by owning a significant, but not controlling, interest in that company. Or, a company may purchase a non controlling interest in another company in a related industry in which it wishes to establish a presence. (Weygandt, Kimmel, & Kieso, 2010). Sometimes corporations will have excess cash for investment reasomns. It may invest in things, incase in the future the economy falls then it has money to fall back on when money is gone, or low. 3. Low-risk, high-liquidity, short-term securities such as government-issued securities are best when investing for short periods of time. 4. Debt securities, from banks and other financial institutions and stock securities from mutual funds and pension funds generate earnings when investing. 5. 6. Stocks of companies in a related industry or in an unrelated industry that the company wishes to enter Q: E12-2 Foren Corporation had the following transactions pertaining to debt investments. Jan. 1 Purchased 50 8%, $1,000 Choate Co. bonds for $50,000 cash plus brokerage fees of $900. Interest is payable semiannually on July 1 and January 1. July 1 Received semiannual interest on Choate Co. bonds. July 1 Sold 30 Choate Co. bonds for $34,000 less $500 brokerage fees. Instructions (a) Journalize the transactions. (b) Prepare the adjusting entry for the accrual of interest at December 31. A. Jan. 1 Debt investments $50,900 Cash $50,900 July 1 Cash $2000 Interest rev.$2000 July 1 Cash $33,500 Debt Investment $33,540 Gain on sale $2,960 Dec. 31 Interest receivable $2000 Interest revenue $2000 References Weygandt, J. J., Kimmel, P. D., & Kieso, D. E. (2010). Financial accounting (7th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.

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Select and profile an organization for the benefit plan-UPS I have selected - Research Paper Example This is evident from the expenses made by the company in relation to the employees as well as retirees health along with the pension benefits. The company seems to have been participating in the various benefit plans such as multi-employer pension and health as well as welfare plans which is essentially trustee-managed. The benefits are provided to the employees and are generally enclosed under collective bargaining agreement. There are various factors such as improper performance of the investment, modification in the demographic and enhanced benefits for the participants that make the company contribute to the plans. It is worthy of mentioning that the company provides single-employer defined benefit as well as post-retirement benefit plan. The company also provides its employees with UPS Excess Coordinating Benefit plan thus providing benefits to the ones who are participating in the UPS Retirement Plan (Homestead, n.d.). It can be mentioned that there are numerous benefit programs that the company tend to employ on a continuous basis for the purpose of retaining the talent in the organization for a longer period of time. It is through such benefit plans that the quality of the work lives of the employees are improved along with significant enhancement of the personal lives of the employees. In the above section, it has been found that UPS has been providing its employees with numerous benefits so that the talent can be retained with the organization and thus the goals of the organization can be achieved. However, it has been observed that despite various competitive employee benefit plan programs, the company has few lacunas in its benefit plans. It has been noticed that the UPS is unable to offer its employees with the same benefit that Central States used to offer. After the company has withdrawn from Central States, the employees are supposed to register in the 401K plan in order to ensure that they obtain enough retirement income. It has also

Cancer (carcinoma or sarcoma) Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

Cancer (carcinoma or sarcoma) - Essay Example In some cases the myeloma cells collect in one bone and form a single tumor known as plasmacytoma. In other cases, myeloma cells collect in many bones resulting in the formation of bone tumors. This condition is known as multiple myeloma. (â€Å"Stanford Cancer Center†) There are some cases, though, when myeloma develops from a harmless condition called monoclonal gammopathy of undetermined significance or MGUS. This condition is indicated by the presence of monoclonal proteins produced by abnormal plasma cells in the blood. (â€Å"Mayo Clinic†) Generally, the balance between proliferation and programmed cell death is maintained by firmly regulating these processes to ensure that organs and tissues are well functioning. However, mutations in DNA that cause cancer disturb these systematized processes by affecting the programming and regulating processes. The normal balance between proliferation and cell death is apparently disrupted. (â€Å"Carcinogenesis†) Particularly for myeloma, the group of abnormal plasma cells multiplies, thus, raising the percentage of plasma cells to more than 10%. Under normal conditions, plasma cells usually make up less than 5% of the bone marrow. (â€Å"Mayo Clinic†) Although the exact cause of myeloma is not known, doctors believe that this sickness begins with a single abnormal cell in the bone marrow. This aberrant cell would then multiply. It should be noted that abnormal cells do not mature and die in the same way as normal cells do. With this, they accumulate and eventually overwhelm the production of healthy cells. (â€Å"Mayo Clinic†) Myeloma cells can also populate the other bone marrow sites in the body since they can travel in low numbers in the blood. If the growth and spread of plasma cells remain uncontrolled, bones and surrounding tissues can be damaged. (â€Å"Mayo Clinic†) Moreover, research proved that there is common abnormality in the DNA of abnormal plasma

Cahapter 6 Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 11000 words

Cahapter 6 - Essay Example Steel being the choice of material, this geometric form adopted with few change by architects of different era and became a distinctive feature of Modern Architecture (Arnold 1996). Besides architectural factor, several steel building, rising up with architectural setback, is outcome of the zoning and planning regulation mandated for the region. Geometric form with architectural setback mandated by urban planning and zoning regulations for high-rise building and skyscraper located in medium and higher density district. First zoning laws in New York first mandated this building form, in 1916 to reduce the shadow of the high-rise building at street and sidewalk (Naeim 1989). According to New York zoning law, the buildings established between 1916 and 1960 raised up to certain height. The height of lower part defined with respect to the width of the street on which building established. Hence, in narrow streets, the setback started at lower story. Starting from that level, they had to s et back until the plan area of one fourth of whole site reached. (New York Skyscrapers 1996) In early years, the effect of setback on seismic performance of steel frames was not main concerns of architects and engineers, especially, if they were constructed in medium or low seismicity region. Although, few steel frames experienced severe damage during past earthquake, no direct correlation between the damage and vertical irregularity found (Youssef, Bonowitz & Gross 1995). In several regions, restrictions set for different building, believed unnecessary for buildings designed with steel frames. (Arnold 1996) and (Naeim 1989) Earthquake resistant design provisions and guidelines, addresses the vertical geometric irregularity as an issue related with the accuracy and reliability of analytical methods, used to define elastic and inelastic seismic demands. Once the

How Does a Cookie Work Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 4000 words

How Does a Cookie Work - Assignment Example Sometimes, the websites also update the cookies in order to customize the site according to the preference of the users. For example, a user visiting eBay might be shown with a range of fitness equipment if he has searched for such equipment in the past. The sight might also welcome the user by name while recommending fitness equipment. Another example of a website which tracks through cookies is DoubleClick. This site develops a repertory of the user by tracking online behavior and purchases. However, the user’s names and addresses cannot be directly obtained from cookies. These can be obtained only if the user has registered himself on the website by giving personal information. Data from cookies and other analysis tools can be used by the online sites to track a visitor. Moreover, this data can be combined with other data collection methods such as offline surveys to build a user’s profile. The cookie text files are embedded on the hard disk of the visitor. When the user returns, tracking ID of the visitor is requested from the cookie and the data stored on the websites’ servers is accessed. In this way, the customized data can be shown to the visitor. All these technology advancements come with some moral implications. The cookies, in particular, are used by the websites to formulate electronic dossier of the visitors with complete information regarding their purchasing habits and online surfing behavior. This is called profiling. For example, DoubleClick offers its partners detailed information or profile of its visitors so that other websites can target customers with appropriate ad contents. Similarly, credit card purchases by the customers can make it possible for the companies to gain access to private or personal information of the visitors raising privacy concerns.

Sociological Theories of social inequality Essay Example for Free

Sociological Theories of social inequality Essay Explain sociological theories of social inequality – is it a good or bad thing? – Functionalism, Marxism, Weberianism and Feminism. Social stratification is a system in society which is based on a hierarchy of power, privilege, and prestige; this then leads on to what is called social inequality. Social inequality is commonly tied to ethnicity, class and gender. White men being at the top of major corporations and black females working in the elderly care sector can and will raise debates of social inequality. Why is it mainly white males as the predominant directors and CEO’s of Fortune 500 companies? This essay will look into and critique social inequality and what certain theorists have to say about it. Unequal opportunities are what is mentioned a lot when social inequality is brought up; unequal opportunities for different social status’ as well as different ethnicities. Moreover, the majority of the Upper Class and Middle Class in this country are white families and the South Asian community and African as well as Eastern European so being treated differently in regard to social status links in very heavily to ethnicity as it coincides to an extent. There are a lot of opportunities that certain people in society do not have. Inequality of opportunities in Lehman’s terms is not getting the same chance at a better life because of your skin colour or gender or social class. As previously mentioned, why is a black male who was publicly educated more likely to spend time in prison than a white man who in return had a private education as therefore he is more likely to ascribe wealth and success because of this inequality of opportunities? The proletariat are the workers in society and the bourgeoisie are the ‘affluent’ business owners and doctors and lawyers of society. Karl Marx, who was a Marxist and started the movement, said that society has two classes of people and they are the two which have just been mentioned.

Evaluation of Mathematics Curriculum

Evaluation of Mathematics Curriculum The question, ‘Why Teach Mathematics?’ as put forward by Ernest (2000), is one without a straightforward answer. Ernest (2000) outlines many difficulties which must be overcome if mathematics is to be taught effectively, namely the wide-ranging and complex aims of school mathematics (Ernest 2000, 7). The debate continues to rage in the columns of the broadsheets, as to whether the mathematics teaching in this country is effective and indeed whether or not it meets the needs of an increasingly complex society. Furthermore, as propounded by Ernest (2000), should the learners themselves be allowed to opt in or out of mathematics learning by choice? The first issue to be discussed is the mathematics curriculum itself. Ernest (2000) recognises four main aims for school mathematics and, therefore, the curriculum: ‘1 To reproduce mathematical skill and knowledge-based capability; 2 To develop creative capabilities in mathematics; 3 To develop empowering mathematical capabilities and a critical appreciation of  the social applications and uses of mathematics; 4 To develop an inner appreciation of mathematics – its big ideas and nature’ (Ernest 2000, 7) These four aims represent the need for a demanding and comprehensive curriculum. The mathematics curriculum has undergone radical changes in recent years, most notably with the introduction of the National Numeracy Strategy in 1998 (DfES 1998). This was followed in 2006 by the renewed Primary Framework for Mathematics (DfES 2006), its aim ‘to support and increase all children’s access to excellent teaching, leading to exciting and successful learning,’ (DfES 2006, 1). Throughout the new framework there seems to be an increased emphasis on problem solving (using and applying) and calculating skills, seemingly in accord with Ernest’s views on the matter, particularly in terms of developing creative abilities in mathematics. The renewed framework for mathematics places increasing importance on developing practical skills and, ‘providing real experiences, context and meaning,’ (DfES 2006, 13), seemingly in line with Ernest’s views. Consequently, it would seem that the current mathematics curriculum is headed in the ‘right’ direction. Indeed current classroom practise is a far cry from the traditional mathematics lessons of the past. Teachers are encouraged to think of the needs of all their learners through using a variety of different interactive teaching strategies. Children are challenged and supported to make progress at a differentiated level. Indeed classroom practitioners are expected to include sophisticated differentiation into their short term planning. This should surely mean that the standard of mathematics within schools is improving. This would also seemingly be at odds with the suggestion put forward by Ernest when he asks, ‘should the same curriculum be followed by all?’ (Ernest 2000, 8). This would imply that if the same curriculum is followed by every pupil, the needs of every pupil are not being met. However, this is not the way that mathematics should be dealt with in the classroom, as summarised by Wain: ‘The degree to which the teacher retains control of what the learners  do each lesson and the extent to which the learners can choose the next task  vary†¦but typical of all is that learning is individualized to a very great extent,  although often within a group setting. Whole-class teaching is, in general,  not used, or used sparingly, and each pupil is engaged in a learning process  that is unique to him or her.’ (Wain 1994, 136) The view that modern teaching methods have improved the standard of mathematics learning in this country is not, however, the opinion commonly put forward by many of today’s journalists. Chris Woodhead of the Sunday Times (August 26th 2007) recently reported that an insufficient number of pupils are obtaining A*-C grades at GCSE level, despite the fact that pass rates are higher than ever: ‘Last year 45.8% of students achieved five A*-C grades including English  and mathematics in the GCSE examination: 54.2% did not. This annual  statistic is one that the government was long reluctant to release. In that  English and maths are of such crucial importance, it is the only statistic  that matters.’ (Woodhead 2007) These figures would seem to suggest that the teaching of maths in this country, and perhaps the maths curriculum itself is in someway failing the young people who sit their GCSE mathematics examination every summer. However, A*-C are not the only pass grades, and this figures could, therefore, be construed as misleading. Institutes of further and higher education do seem to place emphasis on successful candidates having the required A*-C grade in mathematics, however, is this the most useful way of assessing how successful an individual will be at higher levels of study, particularly when that individual may not be continuing their mathematics education beyond GCSE level? Indeed Ernest puts forward the idea that, ‘mathematical attainment is mistakenly identified with intelligence and mental power and used to grade and select persons for various forms of work, including professional occupations, as well as in terms of suitability for higher education,’ (Ernest 2000, 8). Consequently it would seem that too much emphasis is placed on achieving desired grades in mathematics at GCSE level. However, the view of employers and those of higher education institutes is unlikely to change until public opinion is revised, after all, ‘Yes 98% of candidates are awarded some sort of grade, but everyone knows that any grade below a C is worthless in the real world,’ (Woodhead 2007). This argument would seem to lead into another suggestion by Ernest (2000, 8), concerning the viability of the current arrangements for teaching mathematics to five to sixteen year olds in a modern environment, ‘Requiring learners to study mathematics from the age of five to 16 years is less easy to justify if mathematics is not as useful as is often assumed,’ (Ernest 2000, 8). This could be taken to mean, is mathematics as necessary as we think in order to survive and progress in today’s society? It could be proposed that any number of professions, or avenues of employment, do not require the individual to have mathematical knowledge in order for them to execute their duties successfully. Consequently, it could be argued that individuals should be allowed to, ‘opt out altogether,’ (Ernest 2000, 8), if their chosen career path permits it. The difficulty with this route would be deciding at what point in their education the individual should be allowed to opt out of their mathematical instruction. On the other hand Orton (1994, 14) expounds at length on the importance of mathematics in the world today: ‘The indisputable fact is that mathematics is vital to the maintenance of satisfactory living standards. It is mathematics which underpins the science  and technology that support modern society. It would seem to be a  legitimate aim for educators to wish that pupils will come to an understanding  of how society works, and this implies an understanding of how mathematics provides support’ (Orton 1994, 14). Consequently, it could be said that regardless of whether or not we need mathematics for our employment, it is essential for survival in the modern world. At its simplest level individuals needs a knowledge of money and monetary systems to survive in today’s world, something that is addressed by mathematics teaching. At a more advanced level, as technology advances apace, the individual needs to be equipped to operate it in a variety of different occupations. However, is the mathematics curriculum preparing the individual for this adequately? Another question to be considered as part of this debate is, ‘where does mathematics teaching end, and information and communication technology (ICT) teaching start?’ There is surely considerable overlap, and when considering Orton’s (1994, 14) point above, this must be taken into account, indeed the teaching of mathematics must have considerable overlap with a number of different subject areas if it is to be effective. This is a view put forward by the renewed mathematics framework, which places emphasis on the importance of, ‘making links between curriculum subjects and areas of learning,’ (DfES 2006, 13). Making meaningful links between other subject areas and mathematics could make what is learned more valuable as it becomes ‘real’ for the learner. Ernest puts forward the idea that, ‘it is an unhappy learning experience for almost half of the population,’ (Ernest 2000, 8), referring to the experience of learning mathematics which five to sixteen year olds undergo. This would seem to be supported by current research, which indicates that students are reluctant to carry on their study of mathematics beyond GCSE level. Doctor Richard Pike of The Royal Society of Chemistry said in an interview with BBC News: ‘Schools and students are reluctant to consider A-level mathematics to age  18, because the subject is regarded as difficult, and with league tables and  university entrance governed by A-level points, easier subjects are taken.’ (Doctor Richard Pike, BBC news 2007) This would seem to suggest that mathematics at A-level is considered too difficult and insufficiently interesting to tempt students to continue their studies after GCSE level. It also implies that schools and further education institutes are foregoing this more traditional subject in favour of more popular subjects. Doctor Pike also claims that because of this drop in the number of students taking A-Level mathematics, there has been a knock on effect for students wishing to study science at university: ‘Increasingly, universities are having to mount remedial sessions for incoming science undergraduates because their maths skills are so limited, with many having stopped formal lessons in mathematics two years earlier at GCSE level.’ (Doctor Richard Pike, BBC news 2007) If the fact that students are no longer choosing to take their mathematical studies forward into A-level can have such a knock-on effect on their university studies, surely it could be argued that giving students the opportunity to ‘drop’ maths earlier in their education could have even greater implications. Pupils need to be fully aware of all implications before making choices about their A-Level studies. It would seem that thought should also be given to making the prospect of studying A-Level mathematics more attractive to both students, and educational establishments. The concept of making mathematics more ‘attractive’ to the potential A-Level student, takes us back to the discussion we started about the curriculum. It also links into Ernest’s thoughts on appreciating mathematics for its own sake. He discussed appreciating the social role mathematics plays, and has played in the past, (Ernest 2000, 7). Perhaps by incorporating the history of mathematics into pupils’ education it may give them an increased appreciation of the subject itself: ‘The appreciation of mathematics as making a unique contribution to  human culture with special concepts and a powerful aesthetic of its own,  is an aim for school mathematics often neglected by mathematicians and  users of mathematics alike.’ (Ernest 2000, 7) This would suggest that this aspect of mathematical education would be a valuable addition to the mathematics curriculum. Ernest also says that it would be a mistake to confuse an appreciation of maths with ability, as the two don’t necessarily go hand in hand. It is quite possible to develop an appreciation of maths without having an innate ability in the subject (Ernest 2000, 7). Indeed developing an appreciation for mathematics itself, may lead to an increased interest in the subject, consequently this may lead to an improvement in mathematical ability, as interest can be a key factor in children making academic progress. In conclusion Ernest (2000) makes a number of interesting points in attempting to answer the question, ‘Why Teach Mathematics?’ Despite the improvements made to the mathematics curriculum, and the teaching of mathematics, in recent years, there does not seem to have been a sufficient improvement in the number of pupils achieving A*-C grades at GCSE level. There has also been a knock-on effect on the number of pupils taking mathematics at A-Level and beyond, perhaps due to lack of interest, or perhaps due to the difficulty of the subject. Institutes of further education also seem reluctant for their pupils to study mathematics at A-Level. Ernest also puts forward the suggestion that pupils should be permitted to choose to what point they continue their mathematics education, however, this could also have multiple implications. It has been argued that a sound mathematical knowledge is essential for living and working in the world today, despite the fact that many occupatio ns do not necessarily require the individual to have any formal mathematical qualifications. Ultimately a mathematical education would seem to be a necessity for pupils in full time education, however, the way in which it is taught should be constantly reviewed in order for pupils to gain the full benefit of what they have learned. It is the responsibility of educators nationwide to ensure that pupils have a rich and varied mathematical experience, and that they themselves see the importance of teaching mathematics. Bibliography BBC News (2007) www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/6588695.stm, date accessed 27.08.07 DfES (2006) Primary Framework for literacy and mathematics. London: Department for Education and Skills. DfES (1998) The National Numeracy Strategy. London: Department for Education and Skills. Ernest, Paul (2000) Why Teach Mathematics? in Bramall, S and White, J (Eds) Why Learn Maths? Bedford Way Papers London: Institute of Education Orton, Anthony (1994) Aims of Teaching Mathematics in Orton, Anthony and Wain, Geoffrey (eds) Issues in Teaching Mathematics. London: Cassell. Wain, Geoffrey (1994) Learning Styles and Teaching Mathematics: Towards Open Learning in Orton, Anthony and Wain, Geoffrey (eds) Issues in Teaching Mathematics. London: Cassell. Woodhead, Chris. (2007) The GCSE’s Failure www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/article2326707.ece, date accessed 27.08.07